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Review of: Ilse M. Bulhof, On the language of science. A study of the relationship
between literature and science in the perspective of a hermeneutical ontology. With
a case study of Darwin's The origin of species (Leiden: Brill, 1992; ISBN 90-0409-
644-2). Brill Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 34, US S 57.
Introduction
As indicated by the subtitle of her book, Bulhofs study raises three distinct
subjects: literature and science, hermeneutical ontology, and Darwin. Although
they take up separate parts of the book, these subjects are discussed in close
connection with each other. The first part of the book is a case study of Dar-
win's Origin of Species, analyzing it as a work of art and literature rather than as
a traditional piece of scientific writing. The observation that Darwin's success
was principally due to rhetoric and not to fact casts doubt on the traditional
positivistic image of scientific language and practice. The second part of the
book generalizes upon these findings. In chapter five, on the separation of
science and literature, Bulhof traces the history of our conception of natural
science from Antiquity, through medieval nominalism and the scientific revolu-
tion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to modern-day views such as that
of literary theorist Roman Ingarden. The genealogy of natural knowledge,
Bulhof claims, effectively deconstructs the separation between the 'ornamental'
and the 'factual' use of language with which contemporary philosophy of science
is charged. The ensuing Zwiespalt is revealed as a merely optional device that
was conveniently produced by natural science itself in the course of its early
development. Finally, in the last three chapters, Bulhof argues for a radically
new outlook on knowledge and reality. Chapter six, on literary language and
'evasive' reality, introduces the notion of a 'hermeneutical ontology': a reconcep-
tion of natural reality as being essentially like a text, waiting to be interpreted by
its 'readers'. The requirements for such interpretation, the author submits, are
well beyond the power of positivist science, with its obvious implications of
creative inertia. This brings us back to Bulhof s appeal for a rapprochement be-
tween scientific and literary language, of the kind we purportedly find in
Darwin's Origin of Species.
Bulhofs earlier work includes studies on Nietzsche, Dilthey, and her-
meneutics, as well as historical studies on the reception of Darwin and Freud in
the Netherlands. Although drawing in part on material from her Darwin
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has meanwhile acquired the status of almost a cliche. In this manner one can
enjoy much of the book, being struck again and again by passages from authors
one may never have heard of, and in whose works one may wish to delve
somewhat further.
All this intellectual excitement is to some extent counterbalanced by an effect
that began to worry me more as I penetrated further in van der Pot's book. Too
often, I think, opinions are confronted with other opinions, without any empirical
material being adduced that might enable one to make a choice between one
view and another on other grounds than just a sense of emotional recognition.
Not always, yet much too often matters raised in this book are decided on
grounds of general plausibility. It is here that the outstanding qualité of the
author — his analytical acumen — lays him open to a certain défaut. This is that
one would like to be presented with empirical material which might serve as a
test, thus moving all those numerous opinions to a higher plane — that of
theories in the veritable sense of the word. Too often we are facing just the
conclusions of authors cited, whereas the value of those conclusions resides
precisely in the cogency (or the lack thereof) of the empirical material upon
which the conclusion ultimately rests.
It may seem as if, in voicing this complaint, I am asking for an even bulkier
book than van der Pot's Die Bewertung des Technischen Fortschritts has turned
into already. This, then, is not the case. In this review I have asked for a
somewhat different — more in particular, for a more concise and therefore more
accessible — book. But whether or not an 'abridged van der Pot' would be
feasible is, in the end, neither here nor there. A full translation into English
seems to be in the making, and I recommend it to everyone. For there is in any
case very good reason to admire what van der Pot did accomplish. Few topics in
the history of humanity have exerted quite so tangible an impact upon our lives
as the progress of technology — no one who was not already convinced of this
truth before he touched the book can still get around it upon laying it down.
Any attempt whatsoever to introduce order into the enormous volume of
literature on the subject, and to put that order to good service in hacking a path
through the jungle of literature, thus rendering it vastly more accessible,
deserves our profound respect. This is especially true when the effort is guided
throughout by the sober objectivity, the fairness, the erudition, the coherent
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research, On the language of science is not primarily a contribution to empirical
history of science. Its aim lies rather in the field of meta-science, arguing for a
new philosophical perspective on science and reality. It is with this philosophy
that we shall be specifically concerned in our discussion. The reader is warned:
BulhoFs approach is an unconventional one; by the standards of 'regular' studies
in the history of science it even appears highly provocative. For this reason, the
book deserves the close attention of historians and philosophers of science alike.
A problem in philosophy of science
Earlier critics of positivism, such as Karl Popper and W.V. Quine, rejected the
idea that we are forced by facts to accept our scientific statements. Others, such
as Thomas Kühn and Paul Feyerabend, applied historical, sociological and
psychological analysis to the image of science as a continuous accumulation of
objective information about reality. They presented us instead with a history of
science ruled by rhetoric and continuously disrupted by revolutions. From the
1960s onward, a new picture of science emerged that is essentially relativistic
and anti-realist in its implications, challenging the received view of modern em-
piricists. Our corpus of knowledge about reality appeared to many to be an al-
most free creation of man, constrained only by contingent historical, sociological
and psychological circumstances, not by the object of knowledge itself. This anti-
realism, which is a direct consequence of the view of science as a social con-
struction, evoked strong reactions on the part of a new school of so-called
scientific realists (see, for example, the papers collected in Leplin 1984). Surely
reality has more grip on our knowledge than is admitted by this reverberation of
philosophical idealism? To many the world seemed to be well lost, as anti-realist
Richard Rorty once famously put it.
Philosophy in the 80s was faced with a classic dilemma in a new guise. Either
we accept that culture shapes our science, in which case we can no longer trace
the contribution of reality to our knowledge and lose touch with the world, or
we pledge to the so-called objective facts of positivist science, in which case we
are unable to account for the undeniable influence of sociohistorical deter-
minants. In the course of the past decade, numerous arguments have been ex-
changed between the two factions, but as a result the positions have only
hardened. Arguably, the dilemma between idealism and realism calls for a more
sophisticated and more fundamental approach. One such approach has been
proposed by Hilary Putnam, who introduced a new metaphysics of 'internal
realism' in an attempt to break the deadlock. Use Bulhofs study On the language
of science is another self-conscious attempt in the same direction.
A series of equivocations
BulhoPs contribution to the debate is both inspired and inspiring. In her case
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study of Darwin's Origin of Species, she offers a thorough analysis of the various
literary aspects of this text, covering its use of metaphors, its manner of rhetor-
ical persuasion, its deployment of narrative plots ranging from detective story to
creation myth, its communicative strategies, as well as the structure of its
argument. Carrying on, in a way, the line of narratological analysis of Darwinism
as initiated by authors such as Misia Landau and Gillian Beer (see, for example,
Beer 1983, and Landau 1991), Bulhof shows in detail how strongly evocative and
creative Darwin's writing is.
This unobjectionable observation is only a starting point, however, a first step
toward the stunning thesis that reality is a text. When we consider the overall
structure of On Ihe language of science, BulhoFs argument strikes us as a series
of small shuffles and equivocations. From the consideration that Darwin made
use of metaphors, Bulhof gradually shifts toward the claim that his text is a
model of rhetorical persuasion — meaning that it is not discursive in the tra-
ditional, logico-scientific sense of the word. Her next slide is to the claim that
The origin of species is not a scientific text at all, as traditionally understood.
Rather, it is itself a literary text. This being established, the author infers that
there is generally no apparent difference between science and literature. Now, it
is commonly held that what the language of literature does, as traditionally
understood, is to 'enchant' reality, conjuring up new worlds, and introducing new
ways of looking at the old world. If science is like literature, then we must
accept that science, too, is an enchantment of reality. Far from showing us
reality as it is in itself (the traditional 'disenchantment' view rejected here),
science offers an interpretation, much like a piece of literary work does. From
this claim a final, small step takes us to the conclusion that all reality, including
reality as it is studied by science, is a text, or 'like' a text — for what else can be
interpreted besides a polysemie textual structure?
What's new?
As indicated earlier, Bulhof s frame of reference with regard to 'modern philos-
ophy of science' is typically that of logical empiricism, which makes one wonder
whether she is flogging a dead horse. Positivism was buried years ago by
postempiricist philosophers such as Thomas Kühn, Paul Feyerabend, W.V.
Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Wilfrid Sellars. Almost twenty years after Feyer-
abend's notorious classic Against method (1975), the avowal that rhetoric plays
an important role in science can no longer be called new, of course. In a way,
what Bulhof does to Darwin is what Feyerabend did to Galileo. Also as regards
her general thesis on science and literature, Feyerabend is relevant. In Wis-
senschaft als Kunst (1984), he explicitly explores the alignment of the roles of art
and science in our transactions with reality. Another question that immediately
springs to mind is how Bulhofs 'metaphors' compare to other notions developed
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by postempiricist philosophy, such as Kuhn's paradigms, Mary Hesse's models,
or Imre Lakatos's well-known methodology of scientific research programs. In
important respects, these theories seem particularly cognate to BulhoPs ap-
proach. A comparison suggests that the literary devices used in science are
nothing like the free-floating figments of human imagination utilized in the field
of fiction. Rather, they are serious hypotheses about the nature of reality that
can be put to rigorous test, more or less in the old empiricist way. Finally, and
from a more 'postmodernist' angle, we may ask how Bulhofs hermeneutical
ontology relates to other positions in late twentieth-century philosophy, such as
Putnam's metaphysics of 'internal realism', or the new 'pragmatism' advocated
by Richard Rorty. We shall presently return to some of these issues.
Role of blasphemy underrated
An important background to Darwin's rhetorics that is nearly completely left out
by Bulhof is constituted by the controversial character of his theory. That species
are not created as unchanging entities; that man is the product of senseless
coincidence, not of the God's intention to create in His own image; that nature
is not essentially good and harmonious, but cruel and indifferent; that man
stems from animals, and, even worse, from apes; that Victorian social and
cultural order is not the apex of an inevitable progress toward civilization — such
views were not only bold and unorthodox, but might, still worse, be considered
blasphemous, morally wicked and politically radical.
Darwin was acutely aware of this. As we know from his letters and personal
papers, he was tormented, mentally as well as physically, by the idea of loosing
his reputation as a God-fearing and orderly citizen, which was more than an
imaginary liability in mid-nineteenth-century England. For almost two decades,
Darwin confined his ideas to the drawer, for, as he wrote to his friend Joseph
Hooker in 1844, to publish them felt like confessing a murder. Seen against this
background — well documented by Desmond and Moore in their recent Darwin
biography (1991) — Darwin's fetching poetic personifications of nature and his
incessant avowal of her beauty surely served in part, for himself as well as for
others, to sugar the bitter pill of man's reprobate rapprochement to the animals.
The 'chaplain of the devil', as he sometimes wryly called himself, had every
reason to express his ideas very carefully.
A rich source for the style and rhetorics of Tlie origin of species, and another
background that is badly neglected by Bulhof, was the set of specific genre
conventions ruling natural theology, which studied the forms of life as products
of the wisdom of God. With his theological background, Darwin had been an
avid reader of Paley, and was well-versed in the genre. While he fought its
content (the argument from design), he borrowed from its style, no doubt partly
without thinking, but also in a well-considered effort to avoid offending the
L
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public as much as possible. In this respect we would suggest a (non-exhaustive)
reading of his rhetoric taking P. Bourdieu's Ce que parler veut dire (1982) as its
guideline, uncovering the cultural economy of linguistic exchange, the fields of
power and the mechanisms of self-censorship which govern every discourse to a
certain degree, but which were particularly strong in the case of Darwin's
obnoxious discoveries.
Why Darwin was convincing
As offensive as Darwin's theory was, it nonetheless did not fail to convince,
quickly and in broad circles. According to Bulhof, the positive reception with
which the Origin of Species was met should be accounted for primarily in terms
of its oustanding use of language. It was Darwin's rhetoric that convinced the
public, she holds, much more so than his logic. The nature and quality of
Darwin's argument, the assembled weight of his empirical evidence — according
to Bulhof, these were largely irreievant.
Of course Darwin was an excellent writer, and of course he availed himself
of various rhetorical devices, communicative strategies, metaphors, and narrative
plots. He took them wherever he could find them, basing himself now on the
experience of gardeners and breeders, and on various aspects of social and
economic reality (the struggle for life, the workings of natural and national
economy, the unrelentless economic competition), then again on Malthus's
analysis of the growth of population in relation to the production of food, or on
the astounding performance of the wide range of automated machinery that was
then in vogue. We want to dispute none of these facts about Darwin's use of
'literary' means to convey his ideas. What we do take exception to, however, is
the claim that Darwin's rhetoric explains why his theory was accepted. This
simply begs the question. For why did his rhetoric convince? Presumably,
Bulhof s answer would have to be, 'Because it is in the nature of clever rhetoric
to convince people'. By myopically Fixating on rhetoric, her argument becomes
blatantly circular at this point. She robs herself of the possibility of turning to
deeper levels of explanation, involving the nature and the quality of the 'rhetori-
cally used' arguments.
Let us take metaphors as an example. There is an aspect to metaphors that
is neglected almost entirely by Bulhof. Apart from whatever strictly 'rhetorical'
function they may have, metaphors offer models that may or may not fit the
data, and that may or may not be appropriate in a given theoretical setting. In a
word, metaphors in science behave like testable models. Beautiful imagery is one
thing, but if it is empirically or theoretically inappropriate, or if it turns out to be
not fruitful, then it is relentlessly abandoned. Metaphors in science, we would
suggest, convince to the degree that they are empirically and theoretically fertile,
ordering hitherto disjunct facts, linking hitherto disparate concepts, applying
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methods where they had not been applied before. With regard to the question
raised by Bulhof, viz., how Darwin's succes fou is to be explained, we can now
see that it was not so much because he used metaphors, but because he used
good ones. Bulhofs panrhetoricism, however, is unable to deal with this aspect
of evaluation.
As intimated earlier, the role of metaphors, models, and analogies is widely
acknowledged in modern philosophy of science. Our imagination is bolstered by
'waves' and 'particles' in quantum mechanics, 'flow charts', 'symbols' and
'computations' in cognitive psychology, 'wormholes' in cosmology, and 'organels',
enzymatic 'keys', and 'messenger' amino acids in microbiology. This practice
arguably goes back to the old Aristotelian rule from the Posterior Analytics, that
science advances by understanding what is less known in terms of what is better
known. In more modern terms, metaphor in science is the redeployment of
concepts and solutions developed in one domain for uncovering the hidden
variables in hitherto intractable problems in other domains (see, for example,
Churchland 1989). The question of empirical and theoretical evaluation —
testability and fertility — is one with which any plausible account of metaphor in
science will have to deal.
Summarizing, we see that the use of imagery and imagination does not make
scientific theories imaginary in the literary sense. Of course, scientists must be
imaginative to do a good job — but they simply do nol write fiction.
Reality a text?
Let us now turn to what is probably Bulhofs most stunning claim, viz., that real-
ity is to be seen as a polysemous text, in the sense of a field of possibilities that
are to be interpreted, and thus actualized, by the 'reader'. Every reading, she
holds, is one of numerous, even infinitely many, possible interpretations. In a
postmodern vein, and under the influence of Wolfgang Iser's Reieptionsasthetik
(see, for example, his 1971), reading the text is seen as lending meaning to it,
not recuperating meaning from it. Its meaning, Bulhof holds,
cannot be detached from the act of reading: there is no such thing as 'the' meaning, to be
approached more or less successfully in Che different readings. The meaning ... is the interactive
product of text and reader, and not a given meaning, bidden in the text to be discovered by
interpreters (p, 252).
A genre that is typically referred to in this context is that of poetry. A poem can
continually give rise to new interpretations and new effects; it has not one possi-
ble way of being, but many. According to Bulhof, the same is true of reality.
"Like poems, phenomena in nature, relatively stable as they are, have various
ways-to-be, and become what we (and other beings and forces) let them be in
our dealings with them, in our case notably in our language behaviour" (p. 260,
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italics Bulhof).
Originally, herrneneutics was an ancillary discipline dedicated to the in-
terpretation of texts in law and theology. Dilthey then broadened its scope to
include all human utterances whatsoever. Bulhofs ontology now presses her-
meneutics one step ahead, from the domain of language into that of reality: it
comes to incorporate moons and viruses, rain forests and vulcanoes next to
poems and plays — all that is rich in ambiguous meaning, asking to be read by
man. The instrument of interpretation is turned into a full-blooded ontology:
finally, the maid has become master.
An important motivation for BulhoPs seemingly unorthodox move is her re-
construction of the history of our notion of natural knowledge. In the richly
documented fifth chapter of her book ('On the separation of science and litera-
ture'), she points to two events as being mainly responsible for our present on-
tological predicament: the rise of nominalism in the fourteenth century, and the
scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Medieval nominalism, associated primarily with the name of William of
Ockham, combined an ontology of particulars with a conception of language as a
conventional, hence arbitrary, set of signs. This development effectively spelled
the end for the comfortable idea that our knowledge of reality is objective to the
extent that it is 'dictated' by reality itself. Reality does not dictate, for it does not
speak; we speak about nature, but our language is a contingent set of signs. Ever
since nominalism, Bulhof maintains, the relation between words and reality has
remained problematic.
The scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rang the
knell of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of knowledge acquired by reading
texts, and expanded by means of a priori reasoning. It proposed instead to
reestablish direct contact with nature itself, seeking knowledge through obser-
vation. Bulhof discusses in some detail the efforts made by philosphers of the
period, including Boyle, Galileo, and Descartes, to communicate their observa-
tions in a language that is as neutral as possible, a transparent container for
knowledge that is true to reality itself.
From the seventeenth century onwards, the 'direct' contact with nature by means of experimen-
tation and observation, .was advanced as a replacement for merely verbal dispu-lalion and
acquisition of knowledge by reading books ... By rejecting rhetorical and Sjtefary* language in
truth-finding, and by relying on scientific instruments, expérimental science* separated nature
from the realm of human affairs ... Scientific discourse produced that separation, produced a
reality apart from man (p. 200).
According to Bulhof, the ensuing Zwiespalt between the ornamental and the
factual use of language, which was inherited by positivist philosophy of science,
still dominates our modern conception of natural knowledge. Now, obviously,
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nominalism and observationalism are uncomfortable bed-fellows. If reality does
not speak, then observation cannot hear it. Conversely, if language is a merely
conventional device, how can it hope to cut reality at its joints? It is from this
quandary that Bulhof tries to escape with her notion of reality as a polysernous
text.
Over the past fifteen years or so, the problem sketched here has been
pressed with increasing urge by several other writers, including Richard Rorty
and Hilary Putnam (see, for example, Rorty 1979, 1990, and Putnam 1981). As
noted above, its general background is that of realism and idealism in philosophy
of science. Arguably, all forms of realism at bottom presuppose what Putnam
has called a "God's eye point of view," a notion of reality as it is in itself, inde-
pendent of our knowledge. For if reality does not have a ready-made nature,
how can we claim that our knowledge faithfully represents it? Idealism, on the
other hand, seems to imply that out view of reality is our own free creation.
Putnam's way out of this dilemma (a solution which, at this point, is basically the
same as Rorty's) is to reject the 'God's eye' externalisrn and opt for what he
calls 'internal realism' — the view that our notions of truth and reality can be
meaningfully discussed only from within the particular set of concepts (language)
we happen to be working with; the idea of a framework-transcendent reality is
simply not accessible to reason.
A residual problem for internal realism, and an apparent remnant of ideal-
ism, is the encroaching relativism and 'loss of reality'. There seems to be no way
for us to explicate how the nameless reality lurking behind language guides our
research and constrains our theories. We have lost contact with external reality.
Although Bulhof does not address the issue in quite these terms, her account
can arguably be seen as an attempt to reinstate contact with reality. If reality is
like a polysemous text, then we see at once that our 'reading' of it is neither free
nor found. Rather, it is an actualization of what was already contained in reality
itself as a structure of possible interpretations. Though reality as such carries no
articulate, identifiable meaning, it constrains the meanings we can attach to it,
much as a normal text does. Texts are reluctant, and so is reality.
In order to evaluate Bulhofs suggestion, it may be instructive to compare it
to a view that is at first blush totally different, viz., the naturalistic epistemology
proposed by philosopher Paul Churchland (1979, 1989). According to Church-
land, our theories of the world 'conceptually exploit' the 'natural information'
contained in the deliverances of the senses. Whether this 'exploitation' is
considered at the level of linguistic concepts or at that of the circuitry of our
brains, it amounts to the imposition of order on what is by itself unordered
sensory material. To take a simple example, think of the various interpretations
that can be given of the retinal image of a transparent frame cube (Necker's
experiment, see fig. 1). Each interpretation is a reordering of the same material,
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and thus a new theory of what the world is like. The material may be unordered,
yet it is not chaotic: the 'natural information' it contains is rich enough to
constrain the possible interpretations that can be given of it. In this respect,
Churchland's account is obviously similar to that of Bulhof: they both want to
capture the way in which reality non-obtrusively contributes to our knowledge of
the world. In this respect, Churchland's natural information plays the same role
as Bulhof s polysemous text.
Figure 1 — Ambiguity of Necker cube. The natural information contained in a transparent frame
image can give rise to several mutually inconsistent interpretations. Only two (Î-D) interpretations
are shown in this diagram
There is another aspect to Churchland's view that makes it relevantly similar to
Bulhof s: contact with nature is bought at the expense of an encompassing
master narrative working in the background. In BulhoPs case, this is the
metaphor of the book of nature, while in Churchland's case it is a neurobiologi-
cally informed account of man. Can we say anything about which of the two is to
be preferred? Against Churchland's naturalistic epistemology one might object
that it is a circular project: it makes use of scientific knowledge in the course of
explaining how knowledge of reality is possible. We are not sure whether this
objection is really to the point, however. Notice that the issue at stake, in
Churchland's proposal, is not how to justify our knowledge claims (which would
indeed make the naturalist approach viciously circular), but rather to give a
general understanding of our cognitive intercourse with reality. Why not take our
inspiration where we can find it? Bulhof takes lier metaphor from philosophical
and theological tradition, Churchland takes it from modern science. When it
comes to the crunch, it may well be that 'metaphors' in philosophy should meet
the same standards as 'metaphors' in science, as suggested earlier: if they are
Essay reviews 123
not fruitful, they should be abandoned. The question, then, is whether BulhoPs
new explorations of the 'book of nature' constitute a progressive problem shift in
philosophy.
Christian master metaphor
BulhoPs textification of reality is very close to the traditional trope of the book
of nature, written by a divine Author, and readable by finite beings because they
were created in His image. It reminds us of the old controversy about which of
the two books, that of nature or Holy Scripture, reveals more about the ultimate
origin and structure of reality. References to a Creator are sparse in BulhoPs
book, however, although not completely absent. Her professed loyalty is to
postmodernist approaches in the wake of Nietzsche — ironically so, because, if
anything, postmodernism is the crisis of the traditional grand narratives, one of
which still seems to feed into BulhoPs discourse. The semantic field approach to
metaphor, for one, strongly suggests the impossibility of separating the notion of
a text from the closely related notion of an author. In this respect, BulhoPs study
itself seems to be a better example of the rhetorical use of metaphor than Tiie
origin of species, defending with subtle rhetoric a highly specific, venerable
Western reading of reality, trying to salvage it from radical secularization and
'disenchantment' by more recent scientific approaches. The mystery of creation
has become the polysemy of the text. As far as the prospect of progress is
concerned, there is reason to be slightly worried.
Another aspect of BulhoPs account that causes concern is the fact that her
master metaphor is deeply intellectualist in nature. Its record in philosophical
and theological tradition, as well as its development by Bulhof herself, are tied
to the conception of reading books. The reader (cum libella in angiilo) is
engaged in a predominantly intellectual process of interpretation. There is rea-
son to believe that this choice of metaphor is rather awkward in the present
context. First and foremost, when it comes to finding a metaphor that expresses
the equal contributions of subject and object in knowledge, that of reality as a
book seems to get off on the wrong foot, fraught as it is with the wrong con-
notations, verging on the passive and contemplative. The reader's submission is
admittedly reduced by the appeal to Iser's theory of literature, but it cannot be
taken away completely. What is more, why take the wrong metaphor and try to
tinker it into shape, instead of beginning with a better one in the first place?
Bulhof herself presses the need for an ethical concern in metaphysics and
philosophy of science. In the final analysis, it is for moral reasons that she
rejects the notion of a separated and unmediated truth, because "in present con-
ditions it prevents a humane approach to nature" (p. 273, our italics). This ap-
pears to us to be one of the truly strong points of BulhoPs approach. What she
wants to advocate is a respectful interaction and partnersnip with nature. Now,
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she asks, "would our interpretive freedom in 'reading' the 'text' of nature not
make us responsible for our interpretations in a way that the scientist who sup-
posedly merely 'mirrored' nature could never be?" (pp. 256-257). This strikes us
as a rather strained way of putting the case. It would certainly be different if we
were writing the book of nature — but merely reading it seems hardly sufficient
to convey the ethical dimension of responsibility. Even Churchland's metaphor
of 'conceptual exploitation', discussed above, with its obvious connotations in the
field of economy, seems to be more practically inclined than that of the liber
naturae. Another alternative that immediately suggests itself, and one that indeed
seems to be much more congenial to BulhoPs own intentions, is the metaphor of
a dialogue between man and nature, which obviously has a much stronger ethical
dimension of engagement than the metaphor of reality as a book.
Conclusion
The world is no metaphorical book, although Use Bulhofs book is a metaphor-
ical world: hers. We liked her book, though not her world. The book raises
profound issues in metaphysics and philosophy of science — issues, admittedly,
on none of which we ourselves feel too secure. Her hermeneutical approach isr
certainly a fresh and unconventional contribution to the field, even if we think in
to be misguided in important respects. BulhoPs book is recommended reading
for all those interested in recent developments in the field of Darwin studies,
literary theory, philosophy of science, and late twentieth-century metaphysics.
REFERENCES
Beer, Gillian, Darwin's plots. Evolutionary narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and
nineteenth-century fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Bourdieu, P., Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques
(Paris: Fayard, 1982).
Churchland, Paul M., Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
Churchland, Paul M., A neurocomputational perspective. Tlie nature of mind and
the structure of science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).
Desmond, A. & J. Moore, Darwin (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991).
Feyerabend, P.K., Against method. Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge
(London: Verso, 1975).
Feyerabend, P.K., Wissenschaft als Kirnst (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1984).
Iser, Wolfgang, Die Appellstruktur der Texte. Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbe-
dingung literarischer Proza (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1971).
Essay reviews 125
Landau, Misia, Narratives of human evolution (New Haven/London: Yale
University Press, 1991).
Leplin, J., ed., Scientific realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
Putnam, Hilary, Reason, truth and history (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).
Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the mirror of language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1979).
Rorty, Richard, Contingency, irony, solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
Department of Philosophy
University of Leiden
P.O. Box 9500
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands
Department of Philosophy
University of Brabant
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
